A Cognitive, Correlative Approach to Atonement Theories

This is the second part of the assignment from the previous post. In that post, I offered a definition of theology, and identified what I see as the resources of theology and my theological norm. In this one, I attempt to apply all of that to a particular theological problem. In this case, I chose atonement theories. Atonement theories are an ongoing area of research for me. By atonement theories, I mean attempts to explain how Jesus' life, death, and/or resurrection bring about salvation.¹ Perhaps surprisingly, the Christian tradition is full of different approaches to this issue. And unlike the issue of Christology,² no particular explanation has been uniformly insisted upon as the only orthodox possibility.

If we apply the above observations about theology in general to atonement theories, it becomes clear that an epistemology of atonement theories is needed. For this, we first need a descriptive analysis of the epistemic desiderata of existing theories. This can be seen by first asking what a theory of atonement is and then by asking epistemological observations to guide us. The first question can be understood as asking what kind of correlation is involved in an atonement theory, and the second as asking how epistemology can help regulate that correlation.

It is immediately apparent that the description of theology above fits atonement theories perfectly. While atonement theories can be construed in a number of ways, they all involve correlating the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus with the experience of salvation in the lives of believers. Such theories start with the particular experience of transformation by the tradition. The cognitive response to this is to seek an explanation. Such an explanation must somehow correlate the "past event" with the "present salvation", to borrow terminology from Paul Fiddes.³

The differences between theories center around two interrelated issues: the question of how this correlation is to be made and the varying locations of the 'present' part of the correlation. Answers to the first question vary in the extent to which either the tradition or contemporary context is given precedence. Some, for example, suggest that the primary criterion for an atonement theory is the extent to which it represents what is taught in scripture,⁴ while others apply contemporary sociological theories.⁵

The second point is simply that different theories arise out of different contexts. Context plays a significant role in determining the epistemic guidelines within which a theorist must work. That is to say, context determines what methods are available to a theorist, what basic view of the human condition she operates with, what questions her audience needs answered, and what kinds of answers they will find convincing.⁶

Epistemology can be brought to bear on this problem in the following way: first, we may observe that theories of atonement are essentially particularist⁷ in their assumptions, and second, that various theories are engineered to fulfill different epistemic desiderata based on those assumptions.⁸ These particular assumptions and the epistemic desiderata which flow from them first need to be untangled. Following Alston's work on the concept of epistemic justification, this work must begin with a roughly comprehensive descriptive analysis of the epistemic desiderata at work in existing atonement theories.

This analysis would provide insight as to how the various desiderata at work should be categorized and ordered with respect to each other. It would be naïve to suppose that any process would lead to widespread agreement on a single theory, but such an analysis might potentially illuminate analytic grounds for pluralism with respect to atonement theories. Awareness of the desiderata at work in various theories could show that they are not as incompatible as they previously seemed. At the very least, it would provide clarity with respect to goals and methods for future atonement theories.

1. This is may seem like a broad usage of the term "atonement theory", which at one point only seemed to refer to theories that insisted that Jesus' suffering and death was the central point. But today, the term seems also to refer to theories that insist on emphasizing some other aspect as the central saving point, such as the Incarnation (i.e. Jesus' birth), Jesus' teachings and moral examples, or Jesus' resurrection. See Sam Wells' sermon, "How Jesus Saves Us" for a pretty nice way of breaking this down.

2. The issue of Christology (i.e. the issue of Jesus' nature) was hammered out specifically over different ecumenical councils, with one position named orthodox and others named heretical. So today, to be Christian means to affirm that Jesus is both human and divine. To say Jesus was only human or only divine is to adopt a position that has been ruled out by the historic church. To ascribe one or the other explanation of how Jesus saves, on the other hand, is to choose among several orthodox options.

3. Paul S. Fiddes, Past Event and Present Salvation: The Christian Idea of Atonement, Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1989.

4.
See J. I. Packer, "What Did The Cross Achieve? The Logic of Penal Substition", Tyndale Bulletin 25 (1974), 3-45.

5. See S. Mark Heim, Saved from Sacrifice: A Theology of the Cross, Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2006.

6. One might suspect that the effects of varying the location of the 'present' context would disappear in the case of theories that give great precedence to the tradition, but this is certainly not the case. The context in which a theory arises appears to be an equally important factor in both cases. As observed above, theology involves creative construction even if the theologian intends passive description.

7. By particularist, I mean that, taken together as a whole (as opposed to considering them in their individual contexts) atonement theories start with various particular assumptions rather than beginning with a universalized method.

8. See Alston, Beyond Justification. I am indebted to Alston for the concept "epistemic desiderata" and for this overall approach to a set of apparently competing theories.